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ABSTRACT

While recognizing the popularity of the Bloom and Krathwohl taxonomies, this paper focuses on their shortcomings and proposes new affective taxonomies. The Bloom/Krathwohl approach to curriculum design is built around intellectual ends and ignores self-development and social intelligence. This has become particularly pronounced with the advent of the accountability movement. The Bloom/Krathwohl paradigm is inadequate as a framework for accountability because it includes only goals that are purposive, a means to an end, and ignores goals, such as play, that are ends in themselves. Goals that are ends in themselves are associated with effectance, efficacy, competence, and analytic coping ability. Three new taxonomies recognizing goals that are ends in themselves should be created: a taxonomy of educational objectives with an ego-involvement orientation, a motivational orientation, and a moral-development orientation. Research should be conducted to develop procedures and instruments for evaluating these new taxonomies. (LAA)

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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE AFFECTIVE DOMAIN

A Paper Presented in the Symposium

PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH IN AFFECTIVE EDUCATION

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errata

page 2 line 16 'nay' should read 'any'

page 5 line 23 'acieved' should read 'achieved'

page 12 line 6 'for own sake' should read 'for their own sake'

notes #9 has been omitted; it should read as follows:

9. Kroeber, Theodore C., "The Coping Functions of the Ego Mechanisms" in The Study of Lives ed. by R. W. White (New York: Atherton Press, 1964).

Systematic thought about the outcomes of educational programs has long been dominated by the Bloom/Krathwohl taxonomic framework. There are very good reasons for this state of affairs, most notably the compelling simplicity of the Bloom and Krathwohl taxonomies in the cognitive and affective domains of objectives. It is tempting to conclude that perhaps 'the magic number seven plus or minus two' stands watch over the Bloom/Krathwohl paradigm protecting it from erosion.

Whatever the reasons for the continuing popularity and acceptance of the Bloom/Krathwohl paradigm among educational practitioners, there are serious shortcomings which warrant serious scrutiny by anyone working in the area of evaluation. These shortcomings are the initial focus of this paper. Beyond the explication of the difficulties associated with the adoption of the Bloom/Krathwohl paradigm an attempt will be made to explicate formulations which may ultimately point to a more adequate paradigm for evaluation. A final concern will be the identification of implications for research.

The taxonomic enterprise has a long tradition in academic circles. Over the years scholars have found the creation of taxonomies to be very useful for purposes of systematically organizing reflective thought about the phenomenal universe. This has been true of the Bloom/Krathwohl taxonomic efforts in the realm of educational objectives. Among the beneficial effects one may cite the increased concern for higher level thought processes in both instruction and evaluation, certainly an indication that practitioners are more carefully reflecting upon the ends of education.

These developments, however, are not without their unfortunate side effects. As with any new development in a social system, the increasing prominence of the taxonomic approach to educational design problems has focused attention away from many aspects of public school experience which had traditionally been accorded

a central place in the goals of schools. Robert Havighurst, in addressing the problems of objectives for youth development, observed 'that present institutions---schools and colleges, the family, the peer group, the labor force---are not working as well as they were in earlier decades to assist all kinds of American youth to become competent members of adult society.'[1] The President's Science Advisory Committee, in the report of the Panel on Youth, suggests 'our basic premise is that the school system, as now constituted, offers an incomplete context for the accomplishment of many important facets of maturation.'[2] The Panel on Youth goes on to suggest a wide range of self development and social relations objectives which are designed to assist youth in the acievement of a sense of identity and self-esteem.

At least part of the responsibility for the narrow vision of the schools must be borne by those elements of the education profession which design formal standardized evaluation procedures. Although as early as 1959 J.P. Guilford was acknowledging the independence of social intelligence as a human intellectual propensity[3] there has been little if ~~any~~ any concerted effort to operationalize the fostering of such propensities through formal standardized evaluation. Whereas the traditional liberal education placed as much emphasis on self-development as on scholarly proficiency, the new taxonomic approach to curriculum design built around intellectual ends is eroding the school emphasis on self-development. This has become particularly pronounced with the advent of the accountability movement. This is not an argument that there was or is a deliberate effort to eliminate self-development from the agenda of the school. Rather, the situation is analogous to an ecological system wherein the diversion of resources, i.e., training time, materials, supervisory concern, from one goal to another gradually results in the stultifying of that part of the system which has been deprived of nourishment. If self-development and similar areas of goals of the public school system are to survive the accountability movement

it would seem essential that these goals be conceptualizaed and taxonomized so as to more effectively counter the erosive effects of the established taxonomies, and provide a reference point to educators working in the area of program accountability.

Functional considerations in the construction of taxonomies

The development of taxonomic classifications has traditionally been an honored form of scientific work. One of the basic activities in the development of scientific thought is the conceptualization of a domain of experience. The end product of such conceptualization is frequently, but not always, codified in the form of a taxonomy. Taxonomies, therefore, are peripheral rather than central to the process of scientific investigation; they are otherwise with regard to the preservation of scientific knowledge and the transmission of that knowledge to future generations of practitioners. The existence of the taxonomy provides a benchmark to the learner, helping him to repeat the conceptualization of experience which was the contribution of the original investigator. Thus the cumulative nature of scientific progress is facilitated.

The functionality of a taxonomy can thus be evaluated according to two criteria. In the first case it is derivative of the functionality of the original conceptualization of the domain of experience. Thus if the original conceptualization of experience is predictively sterile the taxonomy itself is dysfunctional in the sense that it perpetuates a less than useful line of inquiry. If the original conceptualization of experience is fertile, then the taxonomy derivative of it may be functional if it meets the further criterion of facilitating the transference of that conceptualization of the domain.

Taxonomies of educational objectives are derived from attempts to conceptualize human development as it occurs in and through schools. Thus the conceptualization of the cognitive domain of educational objectives led to the

taxonomy of educational objectives, cognitive domain.

The functionality of this taxonomy of educational objectives may be assessed in terms of the functionality of the original conceptualization of the domain, and/or in terms of the degree to which it facilitates the transference of that conceptualization of the domain. With regard to the test of functionality of the original conceptualization of the domain, there are no competitive conceptualizations of the cognitive domain of educational objectives, so that it would seem that the conceptual basis of the taxonomy passes the test of functionality by default; there is no competition. The evidence is stronger, however, for the functionality of the taxonomy in the cognitive domain for transferring this particular conceptualization of the cognitive domain to succeeding generations. David Krathwohl and his associates reported already in 1964 that the taxonomy for the cognitive domain had been used extensively by teachers, students, and examination workers, and had gained ready acceptance by educational professionals. If one can assume that acceptance and utilization of a theoretical model constitutes evidence of conceptualization of a theoretical model, then it is implied that at least the taxonomy for the cognitive domain meets the test of functionality in relation to the conservation of the conceptual scheme.

What has been said here about the cognitive domain taxonomy can be said also of the affective domain taxonomy, but only with some rather important qualifications.

B Cognition, D Cognition and the nature of learning

Any learning experience begins with the bestowal of meaning on a stimulus field. In this process the learner has a great range of control over the structuring of the stimulus field and the subsequent interpretation of the field. The purposes of the learner in the learning situation can greatly influence the manner in which the stimulus field is structured and the aspects of the

stimulus field to which attention is directed. Thus purposive attending to a stimulus field will enhance the perception and retention of those elements of the stimulus field which are most critical to the intended purpose; and diminish the perception and retention of those elements of the stimulus field deemed of lesser importance to the intended purpose. This tendency of perceptual behavior may be associated with the concept of D Cognition (after Maslow) and stands in contrast to B Cognition (again, after Maslow) which would be associated with the disinterested perception-cognition associated with true play.

D Cognition and the purposive perceptual functioning with which it is associated seems to be highly compatible with cognitive objectives of education, i.e., the Bloom taxonomic system of objectives. The Krathwohl taxonomy of educational objectives in the affective domain would seem to be adequately descriptive of affectivity as it relates to D Cognition; the Krathwohl taxonomy represents affectivity as an adjunct to the D Cognition of the cognitive taxonomy. There are compelling reasons for questioning the adequacy of this paradigm as a complete structure for determining outcomes of education in an accountability era.

The accountability movement to date has been concerned with measuring the outcomes of instruction. Implicit in this orientation to education is an assumption that (1) all legitimate outcomes of education can be measured; (2)outcomes exist as independent entities apart from experiences through which the outcome is acieved. One may question both of these assumptions.

The belief that all legitimate educational outcomes can be measured is associated with the position that all things are quantifiable. Perhaps one of the earliest expressions of this belief was the 'mythical' medieval discussion of the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin. The discussants in that 'mythical' seminar were confused with regard to the nature

of cultural phenomena. Although it is perhaps safe to challenge the existence of mass and volume in angels, it is nonetheless foolhardy to challenge their existence as cultural phenomena. Thus we are confronted with the specter of the existence of something which has no basis in measurement. There are educational outcomes, legitimated by the general public, which are not at present measurable, at least in terms of short range measurement of outcomes. Illustrative of these outcomes are honesty, patriotism, dependability, responsibility and industry.

The second assumption, that outcomes exist as independent entities apart from the experiences through which they are achieved, suggests a construct of mind which stores information in the manner of a computer, without dimensions of affective tone and without all the subtle attributes which distinguish particular cases of a concept from the general concept. Perhaps implicit in this construct of mind is a belief in the mind as a mechanism which continually recomputes a mean or average (i.e., typical) ideal concept for assimilating any new experience, and throws away all the raw data from which the concept emerged. It is reasonable to assume that when learners are taught concepts as facts subsequent testing of their mastery of those concepts will reflect little in the way of affective tone, and perhaps no non-critical attributes of the phenomena the concepts represent; but that kind of learning is not readily applicable to life outside the classroom. Concepts are useful to the extent that they help us find equivalencies in life experiences. Thus they provide a foundation for prediction, and often through prediction a means of establishing control of our environment. The predictive function of concepts, however, is dependent upon the adequacy of the original conceptualization for providing inferences about outcomes in the new situation. A concept taught abstractly in the classroom will only be totally adequate as a predictor if the teacher has correctly anticipated all the possible applications of that

concept, and has included in his abstraction of that conceptual category all the attributes relevant to any particular situation in the complete range of possible applications of the concept. Thus the adequacy of synthetically created conceptual experiences is limited.[a] By contrast, conceptual experiences emerging from the real world of direct experiences have transfer value outside the classroom precisely because the detail of the original experiences has not been bled out of them by the intervention of the verbal-symbolic abstraction process. Thus these conceptual experiences have a greater adequacy for predictive purposes.

The Bloom/Krathwohl paradigm as a framework for accountability is inadequate precisely because not all the ends of education are necessarily associated with D cognition; some are more appropriately associated with B cognition. Accountability can become more respectable and more consistent with the outcomes of education which are favored by the general public if the objectives paradigm which structures accountability is expanded to accomodate the range of thought represented by the B cognition construct.

B cognition as conceptualized by Maslow is an end in itself. In this way it differs from D cognition, which is purposive, a means to an end. B cognition seems to be associated with the phenomena of field independence (after Witken) as well as with the concepts of effectance, efficacy, and competence (after R.W. White). Because of the centrality of the B cognition construct to this reconceptualization of the affective domain, it is important that some similarities and distinctions between these constructs be elaborated here.

[a] An obvious range of exceptions would be found in the field of mathematics which, by its artificial nature, precludes the possibility of any mathematical concept being anything more than that which is contained within its formal definition. A continuum of adequacy of synthetically created conceptual experiences can be envisioned, running from mathematics at one extreme through affective phenomena (literature, art, music) at the other extreme. Sciences would occupy an intermediate place, with physical science concepts being more adequate and social science concepts less adequate.

The most basic construct would appear to be effectance. This construct refers to a basic motivation which produces activity for its own sake. An illustration of this kind of behavior, pursued as an end in itself, is play.

The second construct, efficacy, or the feeling of efficacy, is described by White as a 'feeling of doing something, of being active or effective, of having an influence on something...the feeling does not have to be connected with the achievement of a particular intended result.'[4]

The third construct, competence, refers to 'a person's existing capacity to interact effectively with his environment...competence is largely a consequence of learning...it can be said that competence becomes in the course of development a highly important nucleus of motivation.'[5]

The construct field independence refers to the analytic coping ability in perceptual functioning. Witkin suggests that field dependent persons lack impulse control and self esteem.[6] Rokeach further refined the concept by differentiating between perceptual analysis and perceptual synthesis as capabilities, and relating perceptual synthesis to his personality construct open-mindedness.[7] Field independence then refers to the perceptual manifestations of competence. All of these constructs seem to be related to Maslow's B cognition, particularly with regard to the perceptual manifestations represented by field independence.

Some of the objectives identified by the Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee are illustrative of B cognition. Several of these follow:

1. Capabilities as a consumer, not only of goods, but more significantly of the cultural riches of civilization.
2. Capabilities to engage in intense concentrated involvement in an activity.
3. Experience with persons differing in social class, subculture and in age.

An immediate difficulty in taxonomizing these kinds of objectives in the manner of Bloom arises from the fact that by conceptualizing these kinds of objectives as outcomes transforms them into D cognition. One way out of this difficulty is to think of accountability in terms of an experience-outcome unity. The Bloom/Krathwohl paradigm, and other similar taxonomies,[b] are appropriate for structuring outcome objectives and other taxonomies can be created, consistent with B cognition and based on the classification of behavior in learning experiences. Several such taxonomies are proposed here. These are (1) a taxonomy of educational objectives with an ego-involvement orientation; (2) a taxonomy of educational objectives with a motivational orientation; (3) a taxonomy of educational objectives with a conceptual-relational orientation.

Notes for a taxonomy of educational objectives with an ego-involvement orientation

The proposed categories of this taxonomy are on the order of qualities of personality style as observed in behavior. As such they would necessitate observation as an evaluation technique, and social situations as a setting for observation. The inspiration for these categories originated in the excellent work of T.C. Kroeber on coping and defending functions of ego mechanisms.[9] There is an assumption implicit in this taxonomy that coping ego behavior is a desirable general category of ego capability.

The categories proposed for this taxonomy are:

I. OBJECTIVITY
A condition of sufficient psychological distance from ego to permit play with feelings and ideas; the condition might be roughly analogous to Lovinger's stage I-5 of ego development, Autonomy.

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[b] Elsewhere the author has presented a taxonomy of educational objectives in the relational domain, which is primarily a taxonomy of social intelligence outcomes, and would be included in the D cognition rubric.[3]

II. EMPATHY
A capability to take the perspective of another and experience in an approximate imaginary manner the emotions of the other.

III. RESPONSE DELAY
A capability or tolerance for waiting, putting off a final decision; capability for operating on a tentative basis; a tolerance for ambiguity.

IV. IMPULSE SUPPRESSION
The capability to control empulses.

V. TRANSFORMATION
The capability to divert or transform impulses and channel them into creative aesthetic expression.

Although some of these categories of objectives might appear to be measurable on an outcome basis, and lend themselves to standardized testing via paper and pencil, such testing may be invalid because of the conditions surrounding the testing situation, which may predispose the testee to operate in terms of D cognition. It is this writer's position that observation of student behavior by a participant-observer in a social situation might prove much more reliable a measure of the capabilities. It is further suggested that an appropriate measure of progress would be a cumulative record of observation over an extended period of years, so as to note progressive changes in these capabilities.

Notes for a taxonomy of educational objectives with a motivational orientation

The rationale for a taxonomy of motivational objectives is based upon the assumption that the appreciation of art in its many and varied forms enriches the human spirit, and exists as a need (the aesthetic need) in all people. The failure of schools to foster and cultivate capabilities for aesthetic appreciation does not mean that youth will develop with a voided aesthetic sensibility; rather, they will develop into adults who relate to aesthetics in a merely passive manner, being incapable of active participation in the world of aesthetic creation and experience. Underlying this taxonomy is the assumption that active parti-

cipation in aesthetic creation and experience (art, literature, music, dance, and athletics) are critical to optimum psychological and physical health of all adults. An educational accountability system which ignores these basics betrays the potential of the human experience and reduces formal schooling to preparation for subhuman levels of existence. The Bloom/Krathwohl paradigm is inadequate for these goals because the Bloom/Krathwohl paradigm addresses itself to evaluation of products, a D cognition orientation. Aesthetic creation and experience as conceptualized in the motivational taxonomy is a B cognition phenomena and draws much of its value from the process or means, rather than the product or end. Like good sex, one of the ultimate aesthetic experiences, getting there is at least half the value.

The proposed categories for this taxonomy are as follows:

I. PERCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
The ability to separate item from field; the ability to break down the field.

II. PERCEPTUAL SYNTHESIS
The ability to integrate elements in the perceptual field in a novel pattern.

III. RISK TAKING
Willingness to try something new, even at the risk of failure.

IV. CONCENTRATION
The capability to engage in intense , concentrated involvement in an activity; ability to focus attention.

V. PLAYFULNESS
The ability to engage in and enjoy non-purposive activity.

Notes for a taxonomy of educational objectives with a conceptual-relational orientation

The rationale for a separate taxonomy of educational objectives with a conceptual-relational orientation arises from some difficulties associated with fitting the ends of cognitive-moral education to the Bloom/Krathwohl framework. Again, the difficulty arises from the necessary antagonism between

D cognition and the higher levels of moral reasoning (after Kohlberg). While the first four stages of cognitive-moral reasoning, the naturalistic stages, are consistent with the nature of D cognition, the latter two stages, the existential stages, are more nearly illustrative of B cognition. They require that the moral reasoner transcend the view of others as instrumental to one's own personal ends, and value others for own sake, certainly the hallmark of B cognition.

This writer is unwilling at this time to suggest a category system for this taxonomy. Rather, it is suggested that this taxonomy remain a blank slate as a reminder to practitioners of accountability of the limits implicit in trying to catalog anything as profound as the education of human beings.

Implications for research

If educators are to attempt to frame accountability in terms of both D and B cognition, procedures and instruments for assessing progress with regard to objectives within the B cognition framework must be developed. These procedures and instruments must meet certain criteria, some of which are enumerated below:

(1) They must be easy to administer (they would be used by ordinary classroom teachers)

(2) They must not require large blocks of time; classroom teachers already have too many demands on their instructional time.

(3) They must focus on learner behavior in natural classroom settings, i.e., not testing situations.

(4) They must be teachable to average classroom teachers, not only in terms of procedures but also in terms of rationale.

Several complexes of procedures which seem to fit some of these criteria are participant observation and specimen records. Specimen records would appear to be the weaker of the two because of the time requirements for administration. Other procedures, perhaps variations on these methods, must be developed and tested for reliability and validity.

A second implication for research centers on research into teachers' abilities to perform these kinds of evaluation procedures. Since the burden of testing in the B cognition framework rests with classroom teachers there is a need for assessing classroom teacher capabilities for conducting these kinds of evaluation. Such research might lead to the development of criteria for entry into the teacher profession, and ultimately to a more expert teaching profession.

notes

1. Havighurst, Robert J., "Objectives for Youth Development" in Youth (Seventy-fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education), ed. by Robert J. Havighurst and Philip H. Dreyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p.88.

2. Report of the Panel on Youth, President's Science Advisory Committee, James S. Coleman, chairman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 2.

3. Guilford, J.P., "Three Faces of Intellect", American Psychologist, 1959, 14.

4. White, R.W., Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory, Psychological Issues, Vol. III, No. 3, (New York: International Universities Press, 1963), p.35.

5. Ibid, p. 39.

6. Witkin, H.A. et al, Personality Through Perception, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 469.

7. Rokeach, Milton, The Open and Closed Mind, (New York: Basic Books, 1960) p. 259.

8. Brandhorst, Allan, "Toward a Taxonomy of Educational Objectives in the Relational Domain", Paper presented at the 56th meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies, Washington, D.C., November 5, 1976.